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Khilafat 
 
The term khilafat has a specific translation in English as `caliphate’ but also a broader 
one as ‘succession `.  These two terms embrace the specific and the general weight of the 
concept of  khilafat in Islamic civilisation. 
 Specifically khilafat refers to the leadership of the Islamic community after 
the death of the Prophet.  Simply, the Muslim community was to be headed by a pious and 
learned mail member of the Quraysh, the Prophet’s clan, who was to defend the land of 
Islam, enforce the law, appoint and supervise godly officers and judges, and to collect and 
distribute alms.  From the assassination of the fourth caliph in 661 down to March 1924, 
when the last Ottoman caliph was dispatched on the night train to Paris, the universal 
caliphate operated for the most part in defiance of the model. Thus, a powerful strand in 
Islamic political thought held that the true Islamic caliphate did not outlast the first four 
caliphs.  Nevertheless, such as the power of the idea of the universal Islamic caliphate that it 
continued to be invoked as a source of legitimacy right down to the modern era. 
The idea of khilafat, of succession, however,  has a more general weight in Muslim 
civilisation.  Indeed, it takes but a moment=s reflection to realise that this must be so.  The 
correct transmission of all the knowledge revealed by God through the Prophet, and realised 
by the early Muslim community, was work of the foremost importance.  No less so was the 
transmission of the work of scholars and mystics who strove in their time to make their 
knowledge socially useful.  But, what might be obvious for the transmission of the Quran or 
the Traditions, or formal and spiritual knowledge, was also the case in other areas such as 
poetry, or painting or calligraphy.  It was celebrated in that classical Islamic form, the 
collective biography, or tazkirah, in which the contributions of a particular family or group or 
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profession through time might be recorded, each biographical entry indicating from whom an 
individual may have received knowledge, to whom he (or she) may have transmitted it with 
anecdotes to indicate the nature of the individual, the quality of his learning and the esteem in 
which he was held by others.  There was a strong tendency for Muslims to see themselves as 
the successors of those who went before them as the makers of their community, of being 
involved in the immensely important task of receiving precious knowledge from those who 
preceded them, of making it useful in their time, and of passing it on to their successors.  For 
some in the specifically spiritual areas it could become an increasingly difficult task.  Right 
down to the nineteenth century the weight of the task was reinforced by the fact that up to 
this time, it had been a world in which books were relatively scarce, in which knowledge 
tended to be transmitted orally, or by example, and was received in person by a pupil from a 
master.1 
 
Meanings of khilafat in South Asia 
The idea of khilafat both in its specific political sense and its more general 
civilisational sense was well-reflected in India.  Under the Delhi Sultanate the sultans 
routinely acknowledged the universal caliphate.  Iltutmish was formally invested as sultan by 
the envoy of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad.  His coins refer to him as the `helper of the 
Caliph’ (Nasir-i Amir al-Muminin), a title used by many who succeeded him.  The name of 
the last Abbasid caliph appeared on the coins of Ala al-Din Masud in the 1240s and 
continued to be used long after his murder in 1258 down to the end of the reign of Ala al-Din 
Khilji in 1316.  Mahmud and Firuz Tughluq placed particular emphasis on their submission 
to the universal caliphate, by then with the Abbasids in Cairo.2  On the basis of the evidence, 
in particular the numismatic evidence, as Aziz Ahmad concludes, `one may assume that the 
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name, or in its absence, the authority of the Abbasid caliph, was accepted practically 
throughout the period of the pre-Mughal rule in India as the source and sanction of the 
sultan=s legal authority.=3 
Under the Mughals any sense of deriving authority from the universal caliphate was 
dropped. In the fourteenth century, long before their rule, the meaning of the term khilafat in 
Persian had begun to shift, reflecting the end of the Abbasid caliphate, and came to be 
synonymous with terms used for state or kingdom like dawlat or saltanat.4  The Timurids 
would refer to themselves as holding a khilafat, a position of great power.  During the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Mughals commonly referred to themselves as Khalifa 
and from the time of Akbar, their capital was referred to as the dar al-khilafat.5 When, at the 
beginning of Akbar=s reign, the Mughals had an opportunity to correspond with Sulayman the 
Magnificent, they referred to the Ottoman sultan as one who had gained the exalted rank of 
Khilafat, although it should be noted that down to the late eighteenth century the Ottomans 
were careful not to call themselves Khalifa or to arrogate to themselves the office of Khilafat. 
 They referred to the young Akbar as being installed `on the seat of the Sultanate and the 
throne of the Khilafat of the realms of Hind and Sind.= In using the term khilafat, both in 
reference to the Ottoman Sultan and to themselves, the Mughals meant no more than great 
ruler.6 
Indeed, in considering the Mughals there is a succession, a source of legitimacy, 
which meant much more to them than the universal caliphate. It was their succession from 
Genghis Khan and Timur.  All is most clearly set out at some length in Abul Fazl=s 
Akbarnama. Abul Fazl traces Akbar= majesty back to the mythic Mongol queen, Alanqoa.  A 
virgin, she `became pregnant by that light [divine light] in the same way as did her Majesty 
(Hazrat) Miryam (Mary) ...=7 The outcome was the line which was to lead to Genghis Khan, 
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and then to Timur, and ultimately through Babur and Humayun to Akbar.  Abul Fazl several 
times uses the term khilafat meaning imperial succession.8  This vision of authority led to that 
genre of Mughal book illustration in which the Timurid succession is represented by, say, 
Jahangir sitting together with Akbar, Humayun, Babur and Timur.9 
While, however, the idea of the universal caliphate was rejected by the Mughals, the 
more general civilisational idea of succession, of islamicate knowledge, example and 
charisma handed down from the past, and particularly from the early years of the community, 
remained strong under the Mughals and after.  It was reflected in respect for the Prophet. 
From the time of `Abd al-Haqq Muhaddiths, who died in 1642, India was a growing centre 
for the study of hadith, reaching a notably high point with the Ahl-i Hadith movement of the 
late nineteenth century.10 Growing emphasis on respect for the Prophet was manifest in the 
considerable increase in biographies of the Prophet in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
and the popularity of nath (poetry in praise of the Prophet) as a verse form.11  Another 
dimension, of course, was the respect given to Sayyids as descendants of the Prophet, thus 
biographies, particularly of learned and holy men, might emphasise the extent of their 
subjects= love and reverence for the Prophet.12  This sense of civilisational succession was 
also reflected in descent from the companions of the Prophet and association with the early 
community at Medina. Thus, the `ulama of Farangi Mahall claimed descent, through `Abd 
Allah Ansari of Herat, from Ayyub Ansari, the Prophet=s standard bearer and host at Medina. 
 Members of the family, who could, lived in Medina or owned property there, while Mawlana 
`Abd al-Bari on his third pilgrimage in 1911-12 made an attempt to visit Ayyub Ansari=s 
shrine at Eyup in Istanbul. 
 The sense of civilisational succession was present in those who handed on 
knowledge of all kinds.  When a sufi pir made a disciple, for instance, he would hand the 
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disciple a shijra, which would show how the saint=s spiritual way had been handed down 
from Muhammad to `Ali, down to founder of his order, and then down to his pir.  Moreover, 
he might remind his disciple, as `Abd al-Bari of Farangi Mahall did in his biography of the 
saint of Bansa, that following the Prophet was the way to come near to God: 
To follow the Prophet truly is this: to follow his habits, his behaviour, 
his manners, his instruction so that the life of the Muslim becomes like  
the life of the Holy Prophet .... This is called the true Khilafat, to lose 
one=s identity in the being of the Prophet.13 
So any disciple of a sufi would sense that they were the latest bearers of most precious 
knowledge, ways of behaving, and forms of spiritual understanding, which would enable 
them to become close to God. 
The sense of civilisational succession was no less present amongst the `ulama. When 
a scholar finished teaching a book to a pupil, and the pupil read back the book to his teacher 
with a satisfactory explanation, the teacher would give his pupil an ijaza, a licence to teach 
the text. On that ijaza would be the names of all those who had transmitted the text, going 
back to the original author of the book.  The pupil would be in no doubt that he was the 
bearer in his time of learning which reached back deep into the community=s past (in the case 
of hadith to the time of the Prophet), learning hallowed by time and by those who had 
transmitted it.  And what was true for the master-pupil relationship in religious learning was 
also true for other forms of knowledge from music to medicine.  
 
The trauma of the break in khilafat 
The period from the ending of the Mughal dynasty in 1858 to the end of the Khilafat 
movement in 1924 was a period of great trauma for the Muslims of Upper India.  In this time, 
many came to face the fact that much of what had been passed down from the past was no 
longer relevant to the present.  The satirist, Akbar Ilahabadi, captures the nature and fullness 
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of the change: 
The minstrel, and the music, and the melody have all changed. Our very 
sleep has change; the tale we used to hear is no longer told.  Spring comes  
with new adornments; the nightingales in the garden sing a different song. 
Nature=s every effect has undergone a revolution. Another kind of rain 
falls from the sky; another kind of grain grows in the fields.14 
The Muslims of Upper India experienced the shock of the Mutiny and the savage 
British response to it.  There was the brutal treatment of the two pre-eminent cities of Muslim 
culture and power, Delhi and Lucknow: the driving out of the populations; the razing of 
many muhallas to create fields of fire; the punching of wide boulevards into the heart of the 
old cities to exercise control, the driving of the railway into them, a symbol of the new source 
of power. British authority was stamped on the face of Muslim India as never before.15 
`Harken to me=, Altaf Husayn Hali told his mushaira audience in 1874, `do not go into the 
ruins of Delhi. At every step priceless pearls lie buried beneath the dust ... times have 
changed as they can never change again.=16 There was the realisation that they must break 
with the succession from the past as exemplified in what C.M. Naim has termed `one of the 
most horrifying scenes in any Urdu novel, when Nasuh, the hero of The Repentance of 
Nasuh, burns all the works of classical Persian and Urdu literature he finds in his son=s room 
because they did not provide a religious and moral education, the route to success in the new 
world.17 There was the realisation amongst the old governing elites that, if they were to get 
on in the new world of British India, they must forsake madrassa learning for the English 
language and English education, as made available in government schools and universities 
and Aligarh College.  There was the realisation amongst reforming `ulama that, they would 
best be able to protect Islam if they abandoned the great persianate traditions of ma`qulat 
scholarship, logic, philosophy and theology, in favour of the revealed sciences, Quran, 
Hadith, Fiqh.  There was the realisation amongst many `ulama and sufis that side by side 
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with this they must also reject many of the ideas and practices associated with Ibn `Arabi, 
which might suggest that there was intercession for man with God. Those who were sensitive 
and reflective realised that they were in the midst of an identifiable break, a sharp break, with 
the past, in particular the persianate past.  It was this which led `Abd al-Halim Sharar in the 
second decade of the twentieth century to document his memory of that past in the pages of 
his magazine, Dil Gudaz, subsequently published as a book Lucknow: the Last Phase of an 
Oriental Culture.18 The grief at the trauma was all brilliantly expressed by Hali=s Musaddas, 
his elegy entitled `The Ebb and Flow of Islam=, published some thirty years or so before and 
declared by Sayyid Ahmad Khan to be a `mirror of the nation=s condition and an elegy 
expressive of its grief=.19  The following passage expresses the feeling of a break with a great 
past: 
When autumn has set in over the garden, 
Why speak of the springtime in flower? 
When shadows of adversity hang over the present, 
Why harp on the pomp and glory of the past? 
Yea, these are things to forget; 
But how can you with the dawn 
Forget the scene of the night before? 
The assembly has just dispersed; 
The smoke is still rising from the burnt candle; 
The footprints on the sands of India still say 
A graceful caravan has passed this way.20 
This sense of final rupture with a great past, of a final rupture with many of the 
central traditions of Islamic civilisation, was symbolised by the Khilafat movement of the 
years 1919 to 1924, in which, incidentally, passages from Hali=s Musaddas were often recited 
at public meetings, driving the audience into convulsions of grief.  This movement did not 
spring from nothing.  From the 1840s Indian Muslims began to take an interest in Ottoman 
claims to the caliphate which had been revived with specific purpose in the treaty of Kuchuk 
Kainarji of 1774.  Both Shah Muhammad Ishaq, grandson of Shah Wali Allah, and Sayyid 
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Muhammad Fadl, leader of the Mappila risings, migrated to the Ottoman empire to support 
its policies.  Steadily, the reforming schools of `ulama came to recognise the Ottoman claim 
to the universal Islamic caliphate and, from the accession of `Abd al-Hamid II in 1876, 
Turkish agents in India, as in other Muslim lands, sedulously worked to stimulate loyalty to 
the caliphate.21  During this period Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who had argued for political 
unity in the Muslim world, and the role which the caliphate might play in achieving it, visited 
India. His impact, however, was limited at the time, although it came to be greater 
subsequently through his influence over Abul Kalam Azad and Muhammad Iqbal.22 
From 1911, fervent interest in the Khilafat was sparked by the endgame of the 
Ottoman empire which, as the empire was dismembered from 1918 onwards, grew into the 
greatest mass movement India had yet seen.  I have often wondered why this movement 
should have grown to such remarkable proportions, why it generated so much emotion?  
Certainly, it took place in the context: of economic disruption caused by World War One and 
its aftermath, of the hardline stupidity of the Government of India=s Rowlatt Acts,  of political 
fluidity and uncertainty created by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and of an 
extraordinarily lively Muslim press, which followed closely every change of fortune in the 
Muslim world. And most certainly it fashioned opportunities for two of the great mobilising 
forces in the politics of the age - the `ulama and Mahatma Gandhi.23  But to all of these 
elements I would like to add one more: the iconic power of the fortunes of the Khilafat, 
representing the end not just of a religio-political ideal but also of many of the real traditions 
and practices which had made up Muslim civilisation. Consciously, or for many 
subconsciously, the threat to the Khilafat, and its final demise, symbolised the breaks, the 
fractures, the loss of contact with the past which Indian Muslims were experiencing in other 
aspects of their lives. 
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The new concept of khilafat 
The end of the Khilafat, however, does not bring to an end the salience of the word 
khilafat in twentieth-century India.  At the very time that one meaning of the word was losing 
contemporary relevance, another was emerging - the caliphate of man.  The origins of the 
new meaning reached back to the Quran but it gained force as a consequence of the religious 
changes brought about by the Islamic revival from the nineteenth century.  Muslim reformers, 
confronted with the problem of how to sustain Islamic society on earth without power, 
created a willed, activist, for some a `protestant= Islam. It was in this context that they 
attacked both the subjects in the madrassa curriculum which smacked of philosophy, 
theology and the triumphs of medieval persianate scholarship and the thought of Ibn `Arabi, 
the so-called pantheistic thinker, and all idea that there might be intercession for man with 
God. It was in this context that reformers both began to translate large numbers of key 
sources - the Quran, Hadith, and the materials to make them socially useful - into Indian 
languages and for the first time put them into print, and began to remind Muslims of the 
horrors of the Day of Judgement and the need for regular self examination to meet the high 
standards God had set for them.  They thus fashioned Muslim individuals who were 
powerfully conscious that they must, in order to achieve salvation, act on earth to sustain 
Islamic society.  And so the individual Muslim conscience came to replace political power in 
Muslim hands as the guarantor of an Islamic order.24 
Arguably, the newly enhanced role of the individual Muslim conscience, and the 
centrality of action on earth to the good Muslim life, was expressed most completely by that 
sensitive and remarkable thinker, Muhammad Iqbal.  For Iqbal, man was chosen by God but 
equally free to choose whether he would follow God=s guidance or not.  Man realised himself 
in the creative work of shaping and reshaping the world.  The reality of the individual was 
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expressed most explicitly in action.  `The final act=, he declares in the closing sentences of his 
Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam `is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which 
deepens the whole being of the ego and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the 
world is not just something to be seen and known through concepts, but to be made and 
remade through continuous action.= 25 Man was the prime mover in God=s creation, as Iqbal 
makes so clear in Man=s response to God in his poem `God=s Talk with Man=: 
You created the night - I lit the lamp 
You created clay - I moulded the cup 
You made the wilderness, mountains and forest 
I cultivated flowerbeds, parks and gardens.26 
As the prime mover, Man was God=s representative on earth, his vice-regent, the Khalifat 
Allah.  Thus, Iqbal draws the Quranic reference to Adam as his vice-regent, or successor, on 
earth, which had been much discussed by medieval commentators on the Quran, and not least 
among them, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn `Arabi, into the modern politico-Islamic discourse of 
South Asia. 27 In doing so he replaces the ideal of the universal caliphate with the fact of the 
caliphate of Man.  
This new meaning attributed to the idea of khilafat was taken up by Mawlana 
Mawdudi, founder of the Jama`at-i Islami, who added his considerable weight to its presence 
in Islamic thought both on the subcontinent and beyond. It was powerfully present in the 
grand narrative of Arab reform from Muhammad `Abduh and Rashid Rida through to Hasan 
al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.  It was no less present amongst the most influential thinkers of 
the Islamic revolution in Iran, for instance, `Ali Shari=ati and Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari.28 
We are only just beginning to come to grips with the significance of Man as the 
successor of God in modern Muslim societies.  It has, most certainly, contributed to the huge 
energy demonstrate by Muslim peoples over the past century.  It has also played its part in 
stimulating individualism and in empowering the self.  There is a growing body of 
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anthropological and sociological research which suggests connections between the emphasis 
on personal responsibility in Islamic reform/Islamism and the fashioning of socially 
responsible citizens - the bedrock of civil society perhaps, the foundation of democratic 
values perhaps.  It is too early to say, but I suspect that the shift in the meaning of khilafat, 
from universal caliphate to the caliphate of man, which took place most visibly in India in the 
first half of the twentieth century may be one of the more momentous changes in Islamic 
history. 
 
Francis Robinson 
28 February 2004 
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